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 1 
The Supreme Court Fails to Correct Past Mistakes by Hiding Behind Super Powered Stare 
Decisis 
by Brendan Johnson*1 
Part I: Introduction 
In Brulotte v. Thys Co., the United States Supreme Court held that contracts that attempt 
to extend royalty agreements past the expiration of a patent are per se unenforceable.2 The Court 
reasoned that patent owners already had a great deal of bargaining power with their limited 
monopoly on the product and found that extending royalties would extend that monopoly.3  This 
ruling has been criticized as being contrary to basic ideals of contract law.4  Further, this ruling 
was not interpretation of existing patent law, but instead was entirely judge made law.5  The 
ruling in Brulotte was recently challenged by Stephen Kimble, the inventor of a popular “Web 
Blaster Toy,” who entered into a royalty agreement with Marvel for three percent of the net 
product sales of his toy with no end date.6   
The case made its way to the Supreme Court challenging what the Ninth Circuit called 
“the Supreme Court's frequently-criticized decision in Brulotte.”7  The Supreme Court upheld the 
ruling in Brulotte, stating that, “respecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong 
                                                          
* Thank you to Professor Caraballo for advising me on this note. 
2 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). 
3 Id.  
4 IPO Urges End to 50-Year-Old Rule Automatically Nullifying All Agreements To Pay Royalties After Expiration 
Of A Patent, IPO DAILY NEWS, https://www.ipo.org/index.php/daily_news/february-6-2015/.  
5 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (Brulotte was thus a bald act of 
policymaking. It was not simply a case of incorrect statutory interpretation. It was not really statutory interpretation 
at all). 
6 Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1158 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
7 Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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decisions.”8  To support its ruling, the Supreme Court relied on Hallibutron Co. v. Erica P. John 
Fund Inc., and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.9                         
The Court held that overturning stare decisis, especially when Congress can correct the 
mistakes, requires more than just a belief that the ruling was wrong.10  This note will argue that 
the majority in the Supreme Court ruled incorrectly and did not properly consider the economic 
and social realities of its decision.  Part II will discuss the background information to Kimble v. 
Marvel Enterprises and the Courts rationale for that decision.  Part II will also give a brief 
overview of anti-trust and parent law. Part III will analyze why the decision in Kimble was 
incorrect and discuss some possible alternative decision the Court could have reached. 
Additional Part II will break down the cases and arguments used by both the majority and the 
dissent in Kimble. 
Part II: Background and Changes leading up to Kimble 
This section will discuss background of Brulotte and the Courts rationale for that 
decision.  It will also briefly look at the evolution of patent and anti-trust law and the criticism of 
the Brulotte decision.  Finally, this section will give a breakdown of Kimble as it went through 
the various courts giving the pertinent facts.  There has been a large amount of criticism 
surrounding the decision in Buroltte the Seventh Circuit stated, in Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 
that the Supreme Court’s reasoning was dubious and that it showed the Court was out of touch 
                                                          
8 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015). 
9 Id. (citing Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2406 (2014), Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2369 (1989)). 
10 Id. 
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with reality.11  The Seventh Circuit in Scheiber also stated that if they had the power to that they 
would overrule the Supreme Court’s decision.12 
A. Summary of Brulotte 
Brulotte involved an agreement between the owner of patents for a hop-picking machine 
and two farmers who purchased the machines for a flat sum and a yearly royalty agreement.13 
The royalty agreement did not state an end date and the farmers, after several years, refused to 
make any further royalty payments.14  
The trial court and the Supreme Court of Washington held for the owner of the patent and 
the US Supreme Court reversed.15  The Court held that to allow a royalty to extend past the 
expiration of patent would go against the purpose of the Patent Act, although nothing in the 
Patent Act mentions royalty agreements.16  The Court reasoned that the restrictions on royalties 
were necessary in the prevention of unjust patent monopolies.17  The Court’s reasoning was that 
after the expiration date of a patent the product should be freely available to all who chose to use 
it and continued royalty agreements would lead to an unjust monopoly.18  
The Court also found that having a patent already grants the owner with substantial 
leverage in negotiations and that allowing the owner to use that leverage to extend royalty 
agreements would give patent owners unfair bargaining power.19  
 
                                                          
11 Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002). 
12 Id. 
13 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 30. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. (citing 35 USCS § 154). 
17 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 33.  
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B. Court Interpretation of Anti-Trust Law  
Anti-trust law originally had a per se rule similar to the Court’s current interpretation of 
patent law.20 The Court had strict interpretation that all vertical monopolies constituted a restraint 
on trade.21  The Supreme Court, however, has held for many years that Congress only intended 
to outlaw restraints on trade that were unreasonable.22  Most anti-trust cases are considered on a 
case-by-case basis employing a rule of reason that looks at the specific information presented in 
each case.23  The reasoning behind this case-by-case analysis was based upon on the complicated 
and situational nature of whether or not an activity is actually restricting competition or creating 
a monopoly.24  
Similarly to the Court’s interpretation of anti-trust law, patent law is judge made law 
going beyond the terms found in the statute.25 This has led many to advocate for a case-by-case 
analysis of whether a royalty agreement should be allowed to continue past the expiration of a 
patent.26  The International Patent Owners Association also endorsed the use of the rule of reason 
after evaluating more than one hundred years of anti-trust and patent misuse law.27 
C. Summary of Kimble 
On May 23, 2008, Marvel informed Kimble that he was not entitled to certain extra value 
royalties and that Marvel had overpaid him by $282,700 in 2007.28  Kimble originally brought 
                                                          
20 United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 558 (1898). 
21 Id. 
22 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 Kimble, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2417 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
26 Scott Doyle, Brulotte Rule Upheld Despite Suspect Economic Rationale, 
http://www.law360.com/articles/670682/brulotte-rule-upheld-despite-suspect-economic-rationale 
27 IPO Urges End to 50-Year-Old Ruling Automatically Nullifying all to Pay Royalties After the Expiration of a 
Patent, IPO DAILY NEWS, https://www.ipo.org/index.php/daily_news/february-6-2015/. 
28 Kimble, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. 
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the breach of contract claim before a state court.29 The claim was later removed to federal court 
through diversity jurisdiction.30  During this initial litigation, Marvel discovered the Brulotte 
decision and informed Kimble that they would no longer pay for royalties for his invention after 
the expiration of his patent.31  The district court held that the agreement was per se 
unenforceable, as per the law the Supreme Court had laid down in Brulotte, and Kimble 
appealed.32 Despite the fact that Kimble and Marvel had intentionally bargained for the extended 
agreement it was found void without the district court being able to make any inquiry into the 
fairness of the agreement. 
The Ninth Circuit heard the case and also held for the agreement to unenforceable but 
stated:  
We have previously noted that Brulotte has been read to require that 
any contract requiring royalty payments for an invention either after 
a patent expires or when it fails to issue cannot be upheld unless the 
contract provides a discount from the alternative, patent-protected 
rate.  We acknowledged that the Brulotte rule is counterintuitive 
and its rationale is arguably unconvincing. Nonetheless, 
recognizing that we are bound by Supreme Court authority and the 
strong interest in maintaining national uniformity on patent law 
issues, we have reluctantly applied the rule.33  
 
The Supreme Court decided the case on June 22, 2015 and upheld the rule in Brulotte.34 
The Court reasoned that although the ruling would inhibit some parties from entering into arm’s 
length deals that both parties desired, there were ways to achieve similar enough ends using 
different means.35     




32 Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1158 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
33 Id.; Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).  
34 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015). 
35 Id. 
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  The court relied heavily on the reasoning that overturning the decision was precluded by 
stare decisis and that the Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions.36  The Court stated that to 
overturn past decisions would create confusion and uncertainty.37  The Court also found that 
even if Kimble is correct and the law should be changed because of serious economic error in the 
Brulotte decision, that it was not the Court’s place to change it.38 The Court stated that Kimble 
could take his grievances to Congress and that Congress has had ample time to change the law if 
it felt Brulotte was incorrect. 39 
i. Kimble dissent 
The dissent contended that the Court was free to overrule the law in Brulotte because it 
was judge made law to begin with.40  The dissent also stated that the holding in Brulotte was 
based upon incorrect economic and policy justifications.41  The dissent continues that the 
majority has downplayed the harm of its decision and that not only is counter to traditional 
contract law, the holding will also serve to upset party’s expectations.42  
Also pointed out is how difficult it is to get legislation passed through Congress and that 









39 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) 
40 Id. at 2409. 
41 Id. 
42Id. at 2404. 
43 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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III. Analysis  
A. The Court’s misplaced reliance on Stare Decisis  
The Court in Kimble relied heavily on the notion that stare decisis preempted them from 
overturning the decision in Brulotte by virtue of the fact that it had been decided.44  The Court 
stated that it is difficult to override precedent and that adherence to previous decisions is the 
foundation of the judicial system.45  The Court goes as far to say that even incorrect decisions 
should be upheld in the name of reliability.46  The Court gives additional strength to stare decisis 
when the Court opinion is interpreting a statute because of the possibility that if the Court was 
incorrect Congress could rewrite the law.47  
The common law traditions of the United States is undeniably important, as is the 
necessity of consistent and reliable law.  These concerns, however, are not great enough to 
justify keeping antiquated law in place for consistencies sake.  The holding in Brulotte is not 
something that effects a large number of people and is the type of complicated issue that requires 
close judicial interpretation.  Overruling a judicially made law that has served to upset party’s 
reasonable expectation would not decrease the consistency or reliability of the legal system; in 
fact, it would increase it.  
i. The Court’s ability to overturn past wrong decisions.  
The Supreme Court articulated four factors in Planned Parenthood v. Casey to guide in 
deciding when it is appropriate for to overturn a previous decision despite the concept of stare 
decisis.48  The factors the court considered were: (1) whether the rule has become unworkable; 
                                                          
44 Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2411. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
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(2) if the rule is subject to a large degree of reliance that would create harm if it were overruled; 
(3) if the ruling is now subject to abandoned doctrine; and (4) if the facts surrounding the ruling 
have changed so that the justification for the original ruling is no longer relevant.49   
When looking at the facts present in Kimble it is clear that these factors weigh in favor of 
abandoning the Court’s older ruling because of the lack of reliance on the rule, changes in facts 
and similar rulings that have been abandoned. 
The lack of reliance upon the rule is quite clear, especially when considering how 
relatively unknown the ruling is.50  Marvel, a multibillion-dollar corporation with thousands of 
copyrights that deals frequently with patents, was entirely unaware of the ruling at the outset of 
its deal with Kimble.51  Marvel did not realize the rule existed until they stumbled upon it in their 
first lawsuit against Kimble.52  The dissent pointed out that so few people and companies are 
aware of this rule that in most cases it would actually serve to harm a party's reasonable reliance 
on commonly understood contract law.53  The notion that an arm’s length agreement would be 
voided regales of the position of the parties and legality of agreement is counter to the notion of 
pacta sunt servanda.54   The small number of cases on this matter and the relatively small 
number of people that it affects also shows a lack of reliance on the law.  The fact that the cases 
that have been brought regarding this judge made law have all involved matters where the parties 
were unaware of the ruling and were not relying upon it is proof of the lack of reliance.55 
                                                          
49 Id. 
50 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015). 
51 Id.; David Goldman, Disney to Buy Marvel for $4 Billion Dollars, CNN, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/31/news/companies/disney_marvel/. 
52 Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2013). 
53 Id. 
54 ARTICLE: From "Sanctity" to "Fairness": An Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts?, 18 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L. 95 
55 Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2404; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, pincite (1997); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
233 (2009); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 260 (1991). 
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The facts surrounding the rule have also greatly changed in regard to both patent law and 
the nature of information in general.  In 1963, there were only 90,982 patents filed in the United 
States that number rose to 615,243 in 2014.56  The extreme increase in the number of patents 
filed every year exemplifies the wider range of parties filing patents.  This is drastic increase in 
patents filed has been caused in part by modern technology, which has made it much easier to 
file a patent. It is now possible to file patent without ever leaving home with the U.S Patent and 
Trademark Office’s online resources.57  
The case in Brulotte involved a patent owner taking advantage of unsophisticated and 
disadvantaged farmers. 58 Today in cases involving large corporations, such as Marvel, the patent 
owner is disadvantaged.  The Court in Brulotte reasoned that if patent owners could continue to 
reap a benefit from their patents that it may encourage them to keep their patents from becoming 
public.59  Perhaps this was a concern during that time period, but today it would be impossible. 
Anyone can go online and search through all registered patents even ones that have expired.60 
The patents can even be search by keyword or by category, making it easy to specific patents.61 
The website even has a seven-step strategy to help new users find patents.62  
 The Brulotte ruling has become a relic of law that is no longer adhered to in any 
significant extent, as exemplified in the Courts adornment of per se antitrust cases under the 
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., overruled 
                                                          
56 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart  Calendar Years 163-2014, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.html. 
57U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, File Online, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/file-online. 
58 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). 
59 Id. 
60U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Search for Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-
process/search-patents. 
61 Id. 
62 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Seven Step Strategy, http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-
resources/support-centers/patent-and-trademark-resource-centers-ptrc/resources/seven. 
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previous precedent that held vertical price restraints were per se illegal under the Sherman Act.63  
The Court replaced the per se rule with a rule of reason that looks at each individual case to 
determine if the vertical price restraints are indeed anti-competitive.64  In the Court’s decision, it 
reasoned that it is dangerous to rely on the economic understandings of the past, considering how 
different today’s modern economy is than it was in the past.65  The Court did not accept the 
argument that certain administrative advantages warrant the Court maintaining the per se 
standard.66  The Court stated that there are demanding standards that must be meet to justify a 
per se rule and that the possibility that there could be vertical price control and a complete lack 
of anti-competitive behavior precluded the Court from finding that the standard had been met.67 
 The Kimble Court’s decision to keep the Brulotte rule in place is counter to the standards 
articulated in Casey.  The Court stated how difficult it would be to implement a rule of reason 
and spoke of the challenge administrative challenges of changing past laws.68  At a certain point 
administrative challenges should be a factor that influences the Court’s decisions, but that should 
be reserved for situations in which the challenges are great.  The greatest challenge of 
implementing a rule of reason over a per se rule would be the requirement that the courts look 
into each individual matter to determine if an anti-competitive action has taken place.  At first 
this might prove to be a slight challenge but case law would quickly develop and guide the 
courts.  Once a system for evaluating the cases on their merits was in place it would be quick and 
easy to decide the cases and would lead to an equitable result. Additionally it would not be 
difficult for a court to quickly determine whether the agreement is anti-competitive. A cursory 
                                                          
63 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007). 
64 Id. at 887. 
65 Id. at 888. 
66 Id. at 895.  
67 Id.  
68 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2411 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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review of the contract and the relative bargaining positions of the two parties would reveal 
almost any anti-competitive behavior.  
The Court’s fears of disrupting the consistency of the legal system and administrative 
challenges are misplaced and shortsighted. The greater value give to administrative efficiency 
over judicial fairness is harmful to both the economy and our legal system in its entirety.   
B. Distinguishing Cases Cited by the Majority 
The majority overly relies on stare decisis to avoid facing their incorrect past decisions.69 
The Justices in the majority place unfounded dependence upon past cases that deal with judicial 
interpretation of statutes.  As the dissent aptly states this is not simply a matter of judicial review 
of the interpretation of a statute, this is judicial review of judge made law.70  In addition the 
Court fails to take proper account of other factors that affect overturning past decisions, such as 
changed conditions.71 
One such case the majority cites for its stare decisis argument is Michigan v. Bay.72  This 
case involved the state of Michigan suing a Native American tribe that was attempting to build a 
casino on land that they had purchased outside of the reservation.73  The state claimed that the 
casino would be in violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.74  The Court held that the 
tribe was immune from the suit because of tribal suit immunity, regardless of the fact that the 
area in question was not on the reservation.75  The Court stated that it does not overturn 
precedent lightly when it made its decision to uphold the rule.76  The Court however, goes on to 
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 Kimble, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2417 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
71 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
72 Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2411. 
73Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2026 (2014).             
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 2038 
76 Id. 
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state how nothing has changed in since that last Supreme Court case regarding tribal immunity.77  
The Court goes to great lengths to justify why the law should not be overturned going into 
various policy justifications and showing how the original ruling was not only correct, but that 
the circumstances surrounding the original interpretations are still just as valid.78  
Michigan is easily distinguishable from Kimble because of the extensive and concrete 
analysis that Michigan gives.79  The Court in Michigan goes to great length to explain why their 
original interpretation of the law was the correct and that the circumstance that lead to their 
previous decision had not substantially changed.80  In Kimble, the Court merely says it is unclear 
if the original ruling was incorrect and that whether the circumstances behind the decision has 
changed enough is unclear without any substantial analysis.81 
Another case the majority relies on is Payne v. Tennesse.82  This case, which was has 
been overruled on other grounds, involves a Defendant challenging the introduction of 
statements made by the family members of murder victim that he claimed were overly 
prejudicial.83  Although the Court speaks of the value of stare decisis, it also states that there is 
not a strict formula to adhere to when deciding whether to overrule past decision.84 The Court 
went on to state that when reviewing past decisions it is important to consider wide policy 
implications.85  The Court decided to overrule the previous decisions, despite the previous 
decision being of a class that is afforded additional adherence.86 The Court in Payne also stated 
                                                          
77 Id. 
78 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2026 (2014). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2412. 
82 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 260 (1991). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 2610. 
86 Id. at 2610-11. 
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“[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and 
contract rights, where reliance interests are involved.”87  
Payne can be distinguished from the case at hand because as the dissent points out the 
current rule of law is operating primarily to upset party’s reasonable expectations.88  In addition 
to parties’ expectations, this case is distinguishable from Kimble because the Court in Payne 
overruled the past holdings even after extoling the virtue of stare decisis.89 
i. Cases Cited by the Dissent   
The dissent cites the case Pearson v. Callahan to bolster their argument regarding the 
majority’s over reliance on stare decisis.90  This case involved whether or not a police officer 
was entitled to qualified immunity.91  The Court overturned the old categorical rule stating that it 
would better adhere to party’s expectations and that the old rule was erroneous judge made law.92  
The Court also stated that, “[r]evisiting precedent is particularly appropriate where, as here, a 
departure would not upset expectations, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule . . . and 
experience has pointed out the precedent’s shortcomings”.93  This speaks exactly to the case at 
hand because Brulotte was judge made law.94  There is nothing in the Patent Act that mentions 
royalties so the entire holding is judge made law.95  
The Court in Kimble had the opportunity to address the shortcomings in the judge made 
law that was erroneously created and instead decided to fall back on the stare decisis.96  This 
                                                          
87 Id. 
88Kimble, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2417 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
89 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 260 (1991). 
90 Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2417 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
91 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009). 
92 Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). 
93 Id. 
94 Brulotte at 177. 
95 1 USCS § 1-376 
96 Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2411. 
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note does not argue that there is no strength behind stare decisis, but rather that it should not be 
used to avoid fully delving into an issue of judge made law to reveal the shortcomings in past 
precedent.  
C. Judicial Interpretation of Patent Act compared to Antitrust Law 
 The Supreme Court has done away with per se findings in regards to vertical price fixing 
in antitrust law.97  The primary motivations behind the Court overruling its past precedent in 
regards to antitrust law were economic changes and upholding party’s reasonable expectations.98  
The Court implemented a rule of reason, which is a case-by-case analysis that better 
serves party’s expectations and notions of justice.99  The Court in Kimble should have created a 
case-by-case analysis for cases where a royalty agreement continues after the expiration of 
patent. Both the original price fixing analysis and the analysis in Brulotte was based upon fears 
of monopolies that are no longer serious concerns.100 
The case State Oil v. Khan involves an interpretation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.101  
The court of Appeals had found it was bound by previous rulings made by the Supreme Court 
that a vertical maximum price fixing scheme was a per se anti-trust violation.102  Similar to the 
lower court in Kimble, the lower court in State Oil did not agree with the ruling, but felt bound 
by previous Supreme Court rulings.103 
The Supreme Court overruled the past precedent and held that vertical maximum price 
fixing scheme was not a per se anti-trust violation.104  The Court established a rule of reason that 
                                                          
97 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.; Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). 
101 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
102 Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1996).   
103 Id. 
104 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
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would address each matter on a case-by-case basis.105  The Court looked towards economic 
justifications and found holding all forms of pricing fixing to be per se unenforceable would not 
properly be addressing the issues at hand.106  When justifying the new rule of reason the Court 
stated:  
Although we do not lightly assume that the economic realities underlying 
earlier decisions have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those 
realities were in error, we have noted that "different sorts of agreements" may 
amount to restraints of trade "in varying times and circumstances," and "it would 
make no sense to create out of the single term 'restraint of trade' a chronologically 
schizoid statute, in which a 'rule of reason' evolves with new circumstances and 
new wisdom, but a line of per se illegality remains where it was.107 
 
State Oil is also relevant because of the stare decisis implications. The Court overturned 
the precedent after going through a detailed analysis and determining that the rule of law that had 
been established in Albrecht v. Herald Co., was wrong and was based upon an economic 
situation that no longer existed.108 
Plaintiff in Kimble asked the Court to adopt a similar reasoning stating that courts should 
look into each individual matter to see if the patent owner is exerting unreasonable control on 
their patent or is attempting to create or further a monopoly.109  
The Court in State Oil relied on another case, Continental v. GTE Sylvani , which 
overturned precedent of a per se rule that was not economically practical or and judicially 
inflexible.110 
In Continental v. GTE Sylvani the Court stated: “Since its announcement, Schwinn has 
been the subject of continuing controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals and in 
                                                          
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988)). 
108 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
109 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2411 (2015). 
 
110 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 118 S.Ct. 275 (1997); Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
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the federal courts”.111  The majority of scholarly opinions have disagreed with the decision, and 
many of the federal courts that have encountered vertical restrictions have attempted to limit its 
reach.112 In the Court’s view, the experience that the judicial system had obtained in the 10 years 
prior to that decision should be applied to the subject of because of its substantial commercial 
importance.113  The Court went on to overrule the per se rule involving broad restrictions on 
selling locations for products.114 
The circumstances surrounding the decision  in Continental are strikingly similar to the 
circumstances the Court faced in Kimble.115 In both cases, federal courts and scholars alike 
criticized the past decisions.116  Recent trends in economic development were also cited, showing 
how the older decisions were out of touch with proper legal and economic ideals.117 
The dissent in Kimble stated “[e]ven taking the Court on its own terms, Brulotte was an 
antitrust decision masquerading as a patent case.”118  This type of case is so similar to an anti-
trust case that would be very reasonable for the Court to adopt a similar analysis.119 Adopting the 
analysis would also create a greater degree of consistency in the law.  
It would be practical for the Court to apply the same rule of reason standard to cases 
involving a royalty agreement extending past the expiration of a patent that is applied to anti-
trust cases. The two are very similar because they both involve potential anti-competitive 
activities, but have a productive and legitimate utility.  
                                                          
111 Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
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Applying the rule of reason of reason would be beneficially from an administrative and 
judicial perspective.  Having more case where judges apply the rule of reason would give the 
judges the experience they need to make decisions that are equitable.  Judges applying the rule of 
reason in more situations will allow them to make their decisions faster and more efficiently 
because of the case law developing more quickly as more cases are decided.  
D. Parties should not be restricted from their freedom to Contract in non-adhesive or 
immoral contracts 
 
The notion that freedom to contract, within certain limitations, is of paramount 
importance to the United States economy was clearly articulated in Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States.120  
 This case deals with an oil corporation monopoly, but goes into an in depth analysis of 
whether agreements that create a monopoly can be ever be enforceable.121 The case also 
establishes that freedom to contract in situations where there are no moral or legal barriers is 
essential.122 The Court referring the great importance of the freedom to contract stated:  
[F]reedom of the individual right to contract when not unduly or 
improperly exercised was the most efficient means for the 
prevention of monopoly, since the operation of the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely contract was the 
means by which monopoly would be inevitably prevented if no 
extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to make 
unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted. 
In other words that freedom to contract was the essence of freedom 
from undue restraint on the right to contract.123 
 
The notion that freedom to contract, absent coercion or illicit content, should be protected 
is not just a relic of the past but still something that is very relevant in American law.124  
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Enforcing contracts as written in arm’s length agreements, where there is no oppression or 
coercion is well established in the common law.125  There is nothing oppressive in the agreement 
between Kimble and Marvel it was clearly an arm’s length transaction between two sophisticated 
parties.126  If there were any party that would be suspected of having an unfair bargaining 
position, it would be the multi-national corporation and not the individual inventor. 
The Court in Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. exemplified another important facet of 
contract law, that deals should not be unilaterally altered.127  The Court stated, “[h]owever, with 
or without restrictive amendment clauses, the principle of freedom to contract does not permit a 
party unilaterally to alter the original.”128  This ruling has essentially allowed Marvel to 
unilaterally alter the original agreement in manor sanctioned by the Court.129  Marvel and 
Kimble had reached a mutually beneficial where Marvel would spread out paying the royalties 
for a lower rate over a longer period of time.130  After Marvel discovered Brulotte they used the 
law to unilateral alter the contract in their favor.131  Now, the consideration Kimble gave for 
lowering the royalty rate is worthless.  
Contract law in the United States aims to promote free business and enforce both 
reasonable expectations and general enforcement.  A fairly formed contract should not be held to 
be invalid without a strong justification.  The mere fact that arms length agreement would enable 
a royalty agreement to extend past the expiration of a patent is not a substantial enough 
justification for the contract to be held invalid.  If all the other elements of a fairly established 
contract are present and no actual harm is shown to flow from the contract than the contract 
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should be enforced.  This consistent enforcement of properly formed contracts is of paramount 
importance to the proper functioning of both our judicial system and the United States economy.  
E.  Parties should not have to contract around a complicated rule to make an agreement 
The Court’s argument in Kimble, manifesting its desire to uphold Brulotte in order to 
create predictable and stable law that will uphold party’s reasonable expectations, is not 
persuasive because the rule is actually severing to upset party’s expectations.  This is clear from 
the very circumstances of the case where the parties were unaware of the law and it neither of the 
parties expected that the agreement could be nullified.  The Court stated: 
The Brulotte rule, like others making contract provisions 
unenforceable, prevents some parties from entering into deals they 
desire. As compared to lump-sum fees, royalty plans both draw out 
payments over time and tie those payments, in each month or year 
covered, to a product’s commercial success. And sometimes, for 
some parties, the longer the arrangement lasts, the better—not just 
up to but beyond a patent term’s end. A more extended payment 
period, coupled (as it presumably would be) with a lower rate, may 
bring the price the patent holder seeks within the range of a cash-
strapped licensee. (Anyone who has bought a product on installment 
can relate) . . . yet parties can often find ways around Brulotte, 
enabling them to achieve those same ends.132 
 
 The Court’s reasoning begs the question, that if the end result of the deal is acceptable, 
then why must parties overcome unnecessary obstacles to achieve their desired results.  The 
Court admits the value of allowing the deal and how the consideration is reasonable and is 
something that is potentially better for both parties.133  The danger in this decision lies with 
uninformed parties.  The Court is creating a complicated and unintuitive system for parties to 
reach their desired ends.  If two parties enter into a royalty agreement without being aware of this 
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ruling, as were the parties in Kimble, there is a serious risk that their reasonable expectations will 
be upset.  
In addition to innocent mistakes between unaware parties, sophisticated businesses could 
use this rule to harm small investors who have little legal knowledge.  In the future, Marvel 
could structure a deal for royalties for a long period of time and then refuse to continue payments 
after the patent has expired.  Since the current rule is a per se rule, the clause will be invalidated 
without the harmed party having the opportunity to show why it should be enforced.134  
The ruling that the Supreme Court articulated in Kimble could actually enable parties to 
be more coercive.  A clever party could work an extended royalty agreement into a contract with 
the knowledge that once the patent had expired they would no longer be required to pay the 
royalties.  As the rule stands there would be no opportunity for a judge to review the formation 
of the royalty agreement or for a judge to review the relative bargaining power of the two 
parties.135  So, even if a large corporation is duplicitous and underhanded in forming a contract 
with an inventor, the judge will be precluded from reaching an equitable result. This is 
essentially allowing potential coercion to go unchecked.  
F. Policy Reasons for overturning Brulotte 
There are many public policy reasons in favor of contract enforcement and incentivizing 
inventions. There is also no potential danger that a patent owner would be able to extend their 
monopoly over the product because at the end of the day they would not have a patent, but a 
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contract that allowing them royalties for the product.136 There is nothing keeping a third party 
from profiting off the invention once the patent expires.  
i. Party’s reasonable expectations  
The dissent in Kimble makes clear that there is no reasonable risk that extending royalty 
agreements could increase the likelihood of monopolies. 137  
Parties would expect that a properly drafted contract would be enforced by the United 
States government, baring any issues of illegality. Additionally, parties would expect to be able 
to bring a complaint in court if a one of the parties has been coercive. A sophisticated party could 
know the current per se law on royalties and intentionally make a very long royalty agreement 
for a low percentage. That harmed party would not be able to bring this information into court to 
make a case that the contract should be enforced.138 The per se rule is serving not only to upset a 
party’s reasonable expectations, but is also allowing for more sophisticated parties to take 
advantage of their counter parties without any real judicial review. 
This cuts against the majority’s argument that they are adhering to previous 
decisions to create more uniformity and predictability in the law.  By upsetting party’s 
reasonable expectations, the court is creating less predictability in the law.  
ii. Incentivizing invention  
The Intellectual Property Owners (“IPO”) urged the Supreme Court in their amicus brief 
to end the outdated rule that automatically nullifies all contracts that pay royalties after the 
expiration of a patent.139  The IPO stated that the “Brulotte rule undermines the basic integrity of 
                                                          
136 Joshua Kennon, Kimple v. Marvel Enterprises: Supreme Court Clarifies Intellectual Property Contracts in 
Spider Man Dispute, http://www.joshuakennon.com/kimble-v-marvel-enterprises-supreme-court-clarifies-
intellectual-property-contracts-in-spider-man-dispute/. 
137 See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2411 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
138 See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2402 (2015) 
139 IPO Urges End To 50-Year-Old Rule Automatically Nullifying All Agreements to Pay Royalties After Expiration 
of Patent, https://www.ipo.org/index.php/daily_news/february-6-2015/. 
 22 
contracts”.140  The IPO made that statement after reviewing more than 100 years of history of 
antitrust and patent misuse law.141 
Inventions are of vital importance to the advancement of culture and society. Inventions 
are so integral to the advancement and success of our society that it is easy to forget inventions 
lay the foundation to the modern world.  From medical breakthroughs that have cured diseases 
that plagued our ancestors to the information revolution that has connected our world like never 
before, invention is the heart of it all.  The Court has made a great error in so significantly 
limiting incentives for invention.   
If inventors are unable to make financially viable agreements, they may be discouraged 
from the field that has laid down the bedrock to the modern world.  Although inventors may 
seem to gift us with the innovations that we require to continue our modern society they like 
most others are motivated by economic gain.  To take away the possibility of long term benefits 
from a patent regardless of the circumstances is to take away the life blood of the inventor.  The 
rule of reason would enable the courts to balance the need to incentive inventors while still being 
able to safe guard against any possible anti-competitive provisions that might be in the contract.  
iii. How Technology and the Economy has changed since the Brulotte decision 
Having a monopoly on a technological innovation is implausible considering how 
quickly information spreads on the Internet.142  Innovations in communication and the Internet 
now allow information to spread without restrictions more rapidly than anyone could have 
predicted.143  In additionally, all patent information is accessible through the United States 
                                                          
140 Id. 
141 Id. 




patents website.144  There is even a search function that allows you to quickly find the patent or 
type of patent that you are looking for.145  This significantly cuts against the stated justification 
that extending royalty agreements would incentivize parties to hide away inventions and 
innovations. Even if a corporation or inventor wanted to keep their patent secret from the world 
and monopolize the innovation it would be impossible.  Not only are all patents available for 
viewing, on the United States patent website, the prevalence of social media and Internet 
communications allows for a fast and wide dissemination of information146 
It is also important to consider how the parties have changed since Brulotte the case 
involved two farmers who had no legal or business experience.147  In Kimble, Marvel is the party 
who made the agreement to use the patent.148  A large and sophisticated corporation already has 
an advantage in the bargaining process and the Court has increased that power.149 In Brulotte, 
there was real possibility that if the royalty agreement could continue for a longer period of time 
there would be an unfair monopoly on the patented information.150  This is no longer the case as 
even farmers who live far from a metropolitan center have the same access to information via the 
Internet.151 
The dissent addressed the fact that there is no reasonable way that the extension of a 
patent could keep that patent from the public.  
The Supreme Court's majority opinion reasoned that by extracting a 
promise to continue paying royalties after expiration of the patent, 
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the patentee extends the patent beyond the term fixed in the patent 
statute and therefore in violation of the law. That is not true. After 
the patent expires, anyone can make the patented process or product 
without being guilty of patent infringement. The patent can no 
longer be used to exclude anybody from such production. Expiration 
thus accomplishes what it is supposed to accomplish. For a licensee 
in accordance with a provision in the license agreement to go on 
paying royalties after the patent expires does not extend the duration 
of the patent either technically or practically.152 
 
iv. A long royalty period might be in the best interest of all of the parties  
As the dissent in Kimble stated the economic reasoning behind allowing parties to 
contract past the expiration date is quite simple.153  The ability to spread out the royalty 
agreement allows the company purchasing the rights to patent to put up less money up front and 
reduce its risks.154  Speaking on the Kimble decision, Joshua Kennon, a business investor and 
author of several prominent books, stated “cash flows cannot be valued as a perpetuity.”155 This 
speaks to the potentially difficulties an inventor may have in reaching an agreement that is 
economically viable for parties. It also addresses the inherit difficulties in structuring a long-term 
royalty agreement. He went on to state that “[t]he court just reiterated that a major negotiation 
tool remains out of your toolbox, even if both parties agree to it in a free market transaction.”156 
The current state of the law will require a substantial increase in the upfront payment, or the 
royalty rate itself.157 There could by many situations where this rigid cash structure could make a 
deal unworkable. If the party paying the royalties cannot afford a high yearly percentage they are 
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left without any options. That would mean even if the transaction would be beneficial for both 
parties with an extension on the royalty agreement the deal will not go through. 
For example, I want to make a royalty agreement but cannot afford to pay more than 3% 
royalty per year. If the inventor requires more money for his /her invention than the 3%, it may 
be in the interest of both parties to extend that agreement. If that point in which extending the 
agreement at 3% becomes economically viable for both parties is after the expiration of the 
patent than the deal may be unworkable.      
The Court in Scheiber stated, “If the licensee agrees to continue paying royalties after the 
patent expires the royalty rate will be lower. The duration of the patent fixes the limit of the 
patentee's power to extract royalties; it is a detail whether he extracts them at a higher rate over a 
shorter period of time.”158 
The majority has taken a critically important bargaining chip off the table for both parties 
in a patent royalty agreement.159  As a result of the Kimble decision there are many potential 
deals that could have served both parties and the public in general that will never come to 
fruition.   
F. The Court overly relies on the possibility that Congress can overturn the case 
The dissent properly points out that the majority has placed too much trust in Congress 
and has not properly considered the realities of the current political climate.160  Speaking on this 
matter the dissent stated: “The Court also places too much weight on Congress’ failure to 
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overturn Brulotte.  We have long cautioned that ‘[i]t is at best treacherous to find in 
congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.’”161 
The mere fact that Congress considers enacting new legislation, that would over turn a 
judicial decision, but does not enact that legislation should not be interpreted to mean that 
Congress approves of that decision.162  Even where Congress has considered, but not adopted, 
legislation that would abrogate a judicial ruling, it cannot be inferred that Congress’ failure to act 
shows that it approves the ruling.163  To take this view would severely simplify the complicated 
nature of political dealings within Congress.  “A federal statute must withstand the ‘finely 
wrought’ procedure of bicameralism and presentment.”164  Even if the proposed law can be 
agreed upon by both parties it still has to be brought up for discussion and not passed over in 
favor legislation that is more important. Additionally Senate rules require sixty votes to end 
debate on most legislation.165  With the countless pressing matters that Congress must attend to 
and the friction between our two main political parties, to interpret Congressional silence as 
acceptance would be a grave mistake. Considering also the small number of people that are 
effect by the decision in Brulotte that was upheld by Kimble its no wonder Congress has never 
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G. Gridlock in Congress 
The political climate in America makes it difficult for even the most mundane laws to 
pass through Congress.166  Bills are not being considered on their merits, but instead on value to 
certain political agendas. Congressional silence can in no way be considered tacit approval of the 
ruling in Brulotte.167 
The political parties in Congress are more willing to shut down the government than to 
cross-political lines.168  Despite fact that congressional gridlock has been shown to be objectively 
harmful to the United States economy it does not seem the standstill will be ending any time in 
the near future.169  This means that even though overruling Brulotte would be good for the 
United States economy, the legislation may never come to fruition because of political divides 
and ineffectiveness in Congress.170 
The problems with bipartisanship has led to a less efficient Congress that not only has 
problems considering legislation, but is also working less.171  The House of Representatives 
worked ninety-five days in 2015, compared to 1995 in which The House worked one-hundred 
and twelve days.172  The Senate worked one-hundred and eighteen days in 2015 and ninety-nine 
in 2013 compared to one-hundred and fifty-one in 1995.173  Although Brulotte is an old decision, 
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it has not been widely reexamined until recently.  Even when Congress is properly functioning it 
would be incorrect to take Congressional silence as tacit approval.174 
Part IV. Conclusion  
The majority in Kimble has given unnecessary superpowers to stare decisis that has 
allowed an incorrect ruling to stand.  The Court places far too much weight on Congressional 
silence.  At the end of the day, the matter is judge made law and for there to be any progression 
in the field it must be judge made change. 
  The Court underestimated the importance of the freedom to contract in an otherwise 
perfectly legal and acceptable contract.  There are obvious reasons why the freedom to contract 
is not absolute, but nothing that typically makes a contract unenforceable (coercion, illegality…) 
is present in this case.  
  The court is dis-incentivizing invention and has created a rule of law that will upset 
party’s reasonable expectations.  A rule of reason that addresses the facts of each individual case 
would have better served party’s interests and better served justice.  The success that the rule of 
reason has had in antitrust cases shows how it would be successful in this matter (which the 
dissent points out is really an antitrust case).175 
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